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1. Interpretation 
 
Professor Fields criticizes a view of arguments from authority which he summarizes as follows: 
 
(1) Arguments from authority are certainly excusable, given certain practical considerations, but 
(2) They are in some important sense sub-optimal vis-à-vis other argument schemes, because 
(3) They violate a fundamental preference in favor of objectivity in argumentation, and 
(4) They violate a fundamental preference in favor of autonomy on the part of those making an 
argument. (p. 2) 
 
By objectivity, Fields (pp. 4-5) seems to mean that “the evidence (warrant or 
justification) for the conclusion lies in ‘the world out there’ and not just in another person.” By 
autonomy, he seems to mean a mixture of individualism, responsibility, and self-reliance, such 
that “it is better to do an experiment yourself than rely on the say-so of someone else who has 
done it and claimed certain results” (pp. 1, 2, quoted from Walton 2012, p. 212). With regard to 
Fields’s talk of “sub-optimality,” his meaning is less clear, although what he seems to have in 
mind is also conveyed by other phrases such as the following: “necessarily weaker than both 
deductive and inductive forms of evidence” (p. 1); “a second-class form of argumentation” (p. 
2); “a lesser form of argument” (p. 2); and “there is something problematic about employing” (p. 
9) arguments from authority. It is also relatively unclear whether or not the view being criticized 
is itself an argument, and if so what type: in his discussion, Fields seems to regard it not as an 
argument, but as a set of four theses, perhaps overlapping; but in the formulation quoted above, 
proposition (2) is presented as supported by propositions (3) and (4), although proposition (1) is 
left unsupported. 
 Fields claims, with some plausibility, that such a view is very widespread. Among 
contemporary argumentation scholars, Douglas Walton is found to hold it, based on the account 
given in his book Informal Logic. However, Fields also attributes it to various classics of early 
modern philosophy, such as Descartes, and especially Locke; from the latter, Fields quotes 
several passages from his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
 As mentioned, Fields criticizes such a view. His criticism has two main parts, addressing 
respectively the two main premises of the target or object argument, propositions (3) and (4). 
 One criticism amounts to a denial of proposition (3). That is, Fields argues that appeals to 
authority do not violate the principle of objectivity, giving two supporting reasons: “(1) that there 
is a way of thinking about knowledge (warrant or justification) that will allow one to have 
knowledge or to be justified in one’s beliefs without oneself having had direct access to the 
original source of that knowledge or justification; and (2) that there is a process by which such 
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knowledge (warrant or justification) can be transmitted and thus indirectly accessed” (p. 5). 
 With regard to proposition (4), Fields seems to agree that arguments from authority do 
violate the principle of autonomy. However, he argues that this principle is untenable because, in 
short, it would make knowledge impossible; or in his own words,  
 
unless one has a very good reason for maintaining that there can be no such thing 
as human knowledge or justified belief—unless, that is, one has a compelling 
reason in favor of the thesis of universal skepticism—one cannot maintain a 
general skepticism about the value of expert authority. And thus one cannot 
maintain that there is something problematic about employing it, if it is indeed a 
means by which one is able to discharge effectively one’s primary epistemic 
responsibilities. (p. 9) 
  
 Instead, autonomy should be superseded by what Fields calls the principle of epistemic 
modesty, that is, the willingness to “allow for a ready—perhaps even an enthusiastic—
incorporation into an individual’s set of beliefs those beliefs that are based upon the experiences 
and expertise of others” (p. 9). 
 The first criticism amounts to a claim that the subargument from proposition (3) to 
proposition (2) has a false premise. The second criticism is equivalent to saying that the 
subargument from proposition (4) to proposition (2) is inferentially incorrect, although its stated 
premise is true. Combining both criticisms, the key claim here is that the sub-optimality of 
arguments from authority (namely proposition 2) has not been justified by Locke, Walton, and 
their followers, since their supporting argument is flawed in at least two ways. 
 
2. Evaluation 
 
However, I am not sure Fields wants to limit himself to such critical and meta-argumentational 
considerations. He seems to want to advance a constructive view or argument about appeals to 
authority. Indeed the positive counterpart of his criticism may be stated as follows: arguments 
from authority are optimal (i.e., not sub-optimal) because they are (or can be) objective and they 
conform to the principle of epistemic modesty. That is, arguments from authority reflect the 
modesty of the human condition in which arguers and investigators depend on other human 
beings to learn about the world, and such dependence is an objective fact about human 
knowledge that cannot be denied or avoided. It follows that arguments from authority are not 
sub-optimal. 
 This argument has some plausibility, but the main issue is what the conclusion really 
means; what the talk of sub-optimality amounts to. Let us use some elementary logical notions. 
Certainly this conclusion cannot mean that arguments from authority are deductively valid. In 
fact, I would hold that none are. But they do not aim to be deductively valid. That is, they are 
inductive arguments, which claim that the premises, if true or acceptable, do not render the 
conclusion certain, but rather merely probable, to varying degrees, which define the strength of 
the argument (cf. W. Salmon 1984, pp. 97-101; M. Salmon 2002, pp. 119-21). Next, however, 
this is not to say that all arguments from authority are inductively correct or strong; rather, some 
are and some are not. Their strength or weakness depends on a number of conditions and 
principles of evaluation that assess whether and to what extent the source appealed to is a reliable 
authority about the topic in question and is consistent with the claims of other reliable 
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authorities. One version of such conditions and principles is the so called critical questions 
formulated by Walton and quoted by Fields (p. 9). 
 In short, the conclusion of Fields’s constructive argument is acceptable if his denial of so-
called “sub-optimality” means a denial that all arguments from authority are inductively 
worthless. In other words, not all arguments from authority are weak, some are strong. However, 
besides being acceptable when so interpreted, Fields’s conclusion could perhaps be challenged 
from the point of view of whether it is part of a straw-man argument. For example, I don’t think 
Walton would disagree with Fields’s conclusion so interpreted. But what about Locke? And here 
we come to another strand of his paper, dealing with more historical considerations. 
 Fields quotes some passages from Locke indicating that Locke does hold that no 
arguments from authority have any strength. In Locke’s own colorful language: 
 
The floating of other men’s opinions in our brains, makes us not one jot the more 
knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but 
opiniatrety … In the sciences, every one has so much as he really knows and 
comprehends. What he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreds; which, 
however well in the whole piece, make no considerable addition to his stock who 
gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it were gold in the 
land from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use. 
(Locke 1959, vol. 1, pp. 115-16; quoted by Fields, p. 4, from McMyler 2011, p. 
25) 
 
 In the historical section of this paper, Fields labels such a view a “prejudice” (p. 3). 
However, I would object that here we are not really faced with a prejudice, which suggests not 
only that Locke’s claim is wrong, but also that it was not based on any evidence, or that it was 
accepted before the mostly conflicting evidence was examined. I think that the proper manner of 
formulating the criticism is to characterize Locke’s claim as an injudicious exaggeration. That is, 
he was reacting to a number of genuine problems and progressive developments in the recent 
cultural history of his time, but he went too far. 
 I believe that this more charitable (but still critical) evaluation of Locke’s view should be 
acceptable to Fields himself, since the seeds for it may be found in his own paper. 
 In fact, Fields admits that Locke’s claim is part of a tradition  
 
going back to the beginning of early modern science. It is the tradition that began 
when early researchers, smarting under what may be described as their culture’s 
excessive or indiscriminate use of arguments from authority, were moved to push 
back strongly against the notion of epistemic authority as such and to adopt as a 
model of research and argumentation what has been characterized by one 
philosopher as the ideal of epistemic autonomy. (p. 2; cf. McMyler 2011, p. 30) 
 
Similarly, Fields is aware that “despite efforts of certain early modern theorists like Locke, early 
modern scientists, just like the scientists of today, were never so confused about how to 
discharge their epistemic duties as to actually apply to the practical work in which they were 
engaged this sort of model of epistemic autonomy” (p. 10). 
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3. Elaboration 
 
An example of such nuanced scientific practice that belies Locke’s theory, is provided by the 
work of Galileo Galilei. Galileo’s attitude was nuanced in the sense that he did not practice 
Locke’s wholesale rejection of arguments from authority, and yet Galileo was critical of them in 
various ways. Moreover, besides practicing a judicious criticism of appeals to authority, he was 
reflectively aware of what he was doing and found the occasion to formulate various 
methodological reflections along the same lines. Summarizing a very long and complex story, I 
would highlight it as follows. 
 In his pursuit of a Copernican, heliocentric, and geokinetic world view, in opposition to 
the Aristotelian, Ptolemaic, geocentric, and geostatic view, Galileo had to face many types of 
counter-arguments: some based on the laws of physics, some based on astronomical observation, 
and some based on epistemological principles. Another group of such counter-arguments was 
based on what is stated (explicitly or implicitly) in various passages of the Bible. By and large, 
these were arguments from authority of the following form: 
 
The Bible states that P (that the Earth stands still at the center of the universe). 
(This may be seen from such passages as Joshua 10:12-13, Ecclesiastes 1:5, 
Psalm 104:5, etc.) 
Therefore, P. 
 
Galileo rejected such arguments by arguing that the Bible is not a legitimate authority in 
astronomy, natural science, and natural philosophy (cf. Galilei 2014; Finocchiaro 2010, pp. 65-
96, 243-48). And of course, his rejection of the scientific authority of Scripture was shared by 
others at the time, and gradually became generally endorsed, eventually even by the Catholic 
Church. However, Galileo’s rejection of biblical authority did not extend to questions of faith 
and morals, in regard to which he accepted it. 
 Another group of counter-arguments which Galileo had to deal with was based on the 
authority of Aristotle. These arguments could be schematized as follows: 
 
Aristotle said that Q (that the earth stands still). 
Therefore, Q is true (the earth stands still). 
 
Here, Galileo’s response was not, and could not have been, to reject Aristotle’s authority in 
natural science and philosophy. Instead, Galileo claimed to have greater respect for Aristotle 
than Galileo’s anti-Copernican opponents, so much so that he thought it important and 
instructive to expand such simple arguments from authority. That is, the arguer had the duty to 
examine why Aristotle said so, what arguments(s) he gave to support Q. Now, this examination 
of the authority’s argumentation had two main parts: the first was interpretation, aimed at 
ensuring that we understood the argument(s); the second was evaluation, in order to determine 
the strength of the argument(s). 
 Moreover, with regard to the evaluation of Aristotle’s arguments, Galileo thought that 
basically the arguer had the freedom, and indeed the duty, to arrive at his own evaluation; 
obviously he could not merely accept Aristotle’s evaluation. However, in such an autonomous 
evaluation, Galileo again showed his respect for Aristotle’s authority in various ways. One was 
that Galileo recognized and exploited the fact that Aristotle was the founder of the science of 
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logic, and so the arguer had the duty to learn it and try to apply its principles even to Aristotle’s 
own arguments; and such an application might very well yield a negative evaluation (cf. Galilei 
1890-1909, vol. 18, pp. 234, 248; 1997, pp. 87-88; Wallace 1984, pp. 337-38; Finocchiaro 2014, 
pp. 265-66). 
 Another way in which Galileo showed his respect for Aristotle’s authority was to 
distinguish the substance and the manner of the reasoning in an Aristotelian argument. 
Sometimes it turned out that by using an Aristotelian manner of reasoning in the problem 
situation of the seventeenth century (two thousand years after Aristotle) one would arrive at an 
un-Aristotelian conclusion. A good example of this regards the question of whether the heavenly 
region and the heavenly bodies undergo physical changes. Aristotle had argued that the heavenly 
region is unchangeable because no heavenly changes had ever been observed. Galileo pointed 
out that in his own time many kinds of physical changes had been observed, and so “it is more in 
accordance with Aristotle to philosophize by saying ‘the heavens are changeable because so the 
senses show me’ than if you say ‘the heavens are unchangeable because theorizing so persuaded 
Aristotle’ ” (Galilei 1997, p. 104). 
 Similarly, not all premises of an argument are equally important or equally correct. Thus, 
sometimes an Aristotelian argument is such that by accepting one of its more important and 
acceptable premises, and rejecting one that is less important and correct, the arguer can arrive at 
a conclusion different from the one which Aristotle arrived at. For example, as I have had 
occasion to elaborate elsewhere, one of Aristotle’s arguments was  
 
that the earth is at the center of the universe because it is at the center of planetary 
revolutions. Such an argument presupposes the idea that the center of the universe 
is the center of planetary revolutions; this may be regarded as the Aristotelian 
definition of the center of the universe. Now, Galileo thought that in his own time 
the new telescopic evidence was such that the minor premise of this argument 
could be conclusively refuted, and one could prove instead that the sun is at the 
center of planetary revolutions. It followed that if one applied the Aristotelian 
definition to the new situation, one would have to conclude that the sun is at the 
center of the universe. (Finocchiaro 2014, p. 267) 
 
 Finally, as mentioned earlier, besides practicing such a judicious criticism of arguments 
from authority, Galileo occasionally formulated the corresponding methodological reflections. 
They are comparable in linguistic eloquence and rhetorical effectiveness to Locke’s more 
extreme pronouncements which Fields stresses. In the Dialogue on the Two Chief World 
Systems, Ptolemaic and Copernican, Galileo imagines the following exchange between the 
Aristotelian spokesman named Simplicio and the Copernican spokesman named Salviati: 
 
SIMPLICIO. But, if one abandons Aristotle, who will be the guide in philosophy? 
Name some author. 
SALVIATI. One needs a guide in an unknown and uncivilized country, but in a 
flat and open region only the blind need a guide; whoever is blind would do well 
to stay home, whereas anyone who has eyes in his head and in his mind should 
use them as a guide. Not that I am thereby saying that one should not listen to 
Aristotle; on the contrary, I applaud his being examined and diligently studied and 
only blame submitting to him in such a way that one blindly subscribes to all his 
MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO 
 6 
assertions and accepts them as unquestionable dictates, without searching for 
other reasons for them. This abuse carries with it another extreme impropriety, 
namely that no one makes an effort any longer to try to understand the strength of 
his demonstrations. Is there anything more shameful in a public discussion 
dealing with demonstrable conclusions than to see someone slyly appear with a 
textual passage (often written for some different purpose) and use it to shut the 
mouth of an opponent? If you want to persist in this manner of studying, lay down 
the name of philosophers and call yourselves either historians or memory experts, 
for it is not right that those who never philosophize should usurp the honorable 
title of philosopher. (Galilei 1997, pp. 126-27) 
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